PREEMPTION IN THE FIELD OF
IMMIGRATION: DECANAS v. BICA
INTMODUCTION

Leonor Alberti DeCanas and Miguel Canas were lawfully resident
aliens who believed their right to work in the United States afforded them security against job competition from undocumented
aliens. That security proved illusory, however, when DeCanas and
Canas were discharged by their farm labor contractors, allegedly
because the contractors had a sufficient labor supply.' Perceiving
that they had been replaced by undocumented alien employees who
had offered their labor at a fraction of the prevailing wage, the two
farmworkers sued their employer for damages and for injunctive
2
relief.
These facts triggered the first major judicial test of California
Labor Code § 2805. That code provision prohibits the knowing employment of aliens not entitled to lawful residence when
such employment would have an adverse effect on lawfully resident
workers.3 Both criminal penalties and civil remedies are available
against the offending employer. 4 Though the statute purports to
1. DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 978, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445
(1974).
2. Id. It was necessary to show payment of less than the prevailing
wage in order to prove that the employer's hiring practices had an "adverse
effect" on lawfully resident workers. See note 3 infra.
3. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not
entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.
(b) A person found guilty of violation of subdivision (a) is
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200)
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action
against the employer based upon a violation of subdivision (a).
CAL. AD. CODE tit. 8, pt. 1, eh. 8, art. 1, §§ 16209-16209.6 (West 1975) explains
the operative terms. A lawfully resident alien is one possessing any federal
document entitling him to work in the United States. Knowledge of unlawful residence is knowledge gained by the employer through an affirmative
duty of inquiry. An "adverse effect" is payment to the undocumented alien
of less than the state or federal minimum wage, whichever is greater, or
employment of the alien in a category of work not permitted by the United
States Department of Labor.
4. CAL.LABOR CODE §§ 2805 (b) & (c)(West Supp. 1976).
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be a traditional exercise of state authority over employment relations, its classification of unlawfully resident aliens gives the statute the appearance of an immigration regulation. Because federal
authority over immigration is exclusive," a constitutional challenge

to section 2805 was quickly forthcoming.
The California courts were uniformly unreceptive to the farmworkers' plea.6 In DeCanas v. Bica,7 the California court of appeal
declared section 2805 unconstitutional because of preemption by the
federal Immigration and Nationality Act." The United States
Supreme Court reversed, upholding section 2805 as a legitimate
exercise of the traditional state police power over employment, and
remanded the case for factual determination of the actual conflict
between section 2805 and federal immigration law.9
An understanding of the DeCanas decision is facilitated by an initial examination of the general elements of the preemption doctrine.
A working definition of preemption will be given. This definition
will be considered in its two forms: preemption which is constitutionally mandated and that which is congressionally mandated.
TRADITiONAL PnmEEMTION DocTrmn

Preemption is a doctrine which determines whether state law
may coexist with federal law regulating a closely related area.' 0
Constitutionally mandated preemption is that compelled by article
5. See generally Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283 (1849).
6. The superior court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without leave to
amend (no written opinion). The court of appeal affirmed, 40 Cal. App.
3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). The California Supreme Court denied
plaintiff's petition for hearing. (Oct. 24, 1974) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
7. 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979-80, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 (1974).
8. § 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970).
9. DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976). The Supreme Court said:
States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate
the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.
...
In attempting to protect California's fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens, § 2805(a) focuses directly upon these essentially local problems and is tailored
to combat effectively the perceived evils.
Id. at 937.
10. See generally Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Gibbons v.

one, sections eight and ten of the Constitution.
The Framers included these sections because originally the states had assumed
powers traditionally reserved to sovereign nations.' 2 Thus, certain
powers expressly conferred on the federal government by section
eight are correspondingly denied to the states by section ten. Examples include the powers to coin money and to wage war.'3 The
long recognized categories of exclusive federal authority enumerated in article one, section eight assure that state infringement in
these areas is minimal. State exercise of the treaty power, for example, is inherently preempted, 4 and even Congress may not delegate that power to the states. 15
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

See also Note, Pre-emptionas a Pref-

erential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208

(1959).

This definition of the preemption doctrine has been devised for the

purposes of this article only.
11. U.S. CosT.. art. 1, §§ 8 &10.
12. See 5 ELLioT's DEBATEs 207, 209, 226-27 (3d ed. 1937).
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 5 & 11 empower Congress respectively
to coin money and to declare war. Section 10, clauses 1 and 3 respectively
deny the states power to coin money and to engage in war.
14. "Inherent" preemption is a characterization which begs the question.
Nevertheless, to describe preemption as "inherent" may be harmless when a
state directly regulates an area categorically denied to it under article 1,
section 10. More frequently, however, state legislation will only indirectly
assume aspects of these expressly denied powers, in which case a conclusion
that federal law is inherently preemptive is inappropriate.
Possibly, state laws such as California Labor Code § 2805 which survive
the test of congressional preemption would be invalidated under a theory
of inherent preemption. As noted, article 1, section 10, when read in conjunction with article 1, section 8, reveals that express denials of state authority correspond to affirmative grants of federal power. Article I, section 10,
clause 3 broadly denies the states authority to regulate foreign relations,
while article I, section 8, clause 4 gives Congress the power to establish
a uniform rule of naturalization. Naturalization has been described as incidental to the inherently exclusive federal power to conduct foreign relations. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228-30 (1824). But see Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941), declining to discuss the federal government's per se exclusive powers in the immigration field. The requirement of uniformity and the corresponding denial of state regulation could
lead to the conclusion that immigration, as a sub-category of naturalization,
is a federal concern inherently exclusive of state regulation. For cases illustrating the role of uniformity in the preemption doctrine, see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 372 U.S. 440 (1960); Kelly v. Washington, 302
U.S. 1 (1937); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Brown v. Houston, 114
U.S. 622 (1885); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865);
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
In fact, the issue of preemption in immigration law has not been so summarily decided. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941).
15. This is so because article 1, section 10, 'clause 1 expressly states: "No
State shall enter into any Treaty ... " and does not provide for congressional power to confer such authority upon the states.
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The second major category of preemption is congressionally mandated preemption. 6 The power of Congress to make its legislation

preemptive of state law is based on the supremacy clause'17 and is
either express or implied. Express congressional preemption is that
arising solely from a specific federal statutory provision stating that
the statute is preemptive. Reference to sources beyond the statutory provision in question is generally unnecessary because Congress has unmistakably declared its intent that no state law operate
concurrently over the subject matter. Therefore, express congressional preeemption generally avoids extensive inquiries into Congress's preemptive intent.
In contrast, implied congressional preemption raises many difficult questions about Congress's exclusionary intent. Implied preemption is that based on a finding of congressional intent as inThese factors
ferred from several commonly recognized factors.'
include the language and hist6ry of the federal scheme,19 the need
for uniformity of regulation, 20 and the pervasiveness of the federal
statutory program. 21 Other factors are the real' or potential conflict
inherent in the operation and enforcement of the two legislative
plans,2 2 the actual cooperation achieved between the state and fed16. In a sense, congressionally mandated preemption is also constitutionally mandated, because the congressional power to preempt stems from the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. Art. VI, cl. 2. However, the terminology chosen here reflects the self-executing character of constitutionally
mandated preemption. Congressional preemption, by contrast, depends on
an express or implied expression of congressional intent.
17. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. See D. ENGDAHL, CoNsTrTUTIoNAL POWER, FEDERAL AND STATE 332-39
(1974).
19. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
20. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380-81 (1969); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
144 (1963); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04
(1962).
21. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369 (1969); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 168-69
(1942).
22. E.g., Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 286-88 (1971);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380-81 (1969); LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-

eral schemes, 23 and the traditionally recognized importance of the
24
particular state power in question.
Implied preemption analysis tends to be complex because the
facts of each case will determine the relative weight of the above
factors when found in combination. For example, a state attempt
to bar local airport flights during certain hours in order to abate
noise was held preempted by the need for uniformity of air traffic
regulations. 25 In contrast, the local interest in safe harbor conditions justified a port authority's imposition of pilotage fees despite
an incidental threat to the uniform federal regulation of interstate
commerce. 26 In both cases, when considered in conjunction with
the apparent need for uniformity and the importance of the local
interest, inconclusive statutory provisions were clarified by evidence of congressional intent.
Likewise, the presence of both the uniformity factor and the actual or potential conflict between the state and federal schemes demands close factual analysis. When the facts of the particular case
indicate that the federal interest in uniformity is great, the presence
of minimal or merely potential conflict with state law may be sufficient to mandate preemption. 27 Conversely, if the uniformity factor is not a key consideration, the existence of actual conflict may
be necessary to preempt state law.28 The relative significance of

these two factors is determinable only on a case-by-case basis.
As demonstrated, implied congressional preemption represents
the greatest challenge to judicial analysis. Although the numerous
factors involved in implied congressional preemption complicate the
decisionmaking process, balancing these factors avoids the sweeping
invalidation which sometimes characterizes other forms of preemptions Bd., 336 U.S. 18, 24-26 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
23. See New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 358-59 (1943); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S.
346, 351 (1932).
24. See DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933, 937 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Swartz v. Texas, 344 U.S.
199 (1952); Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931).
25. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
26. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
27. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
28. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143, 146
(1963). For cases involving actual conflict, see Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S.
379 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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tion.29 By remanding DeCanas to the California courts for factual

reconsideration, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of
careful case-by-case analysis whenever preemption is based on implied congressional intent. The manner in which the DeCanasCourt
arrived at this reaffirmation will first be stated, and an analysis
of each stage of the Court's reasoning will follow.
THE SuPREzm CouRT's DECISION IN

DeCanas

The Supreme Court's opinion in DeCanas proceeded in four steps.
The Court first ruled that a state's direct statutory treatment of
aliens as a class is not per se an attempt to regulate immigration. 30
Were it otherwise, the Court reasoned, a line of cases decided on
an equal protection basis could have been summarily decided on
preemption grounds.
Second, the Court assumed that the California statute has only
"some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration." 31
Balanced against that indirect impact was California's interest in
protecting its economy.
Third, the Court afforded the state the initial presumption of
nonpreemption. Thus, the defendant-employer had the burden of
going forward with persuasive evidence either that Congress had
unmistakably intended to preempt the field or that preemption was
a necessary conclusion of the subject matter.32 By considering the
important state interests served by section 2805 and the traditional
role of the state police power in regulating local employment, the
Court concluded that the employer did not meet his evidentiary
burden. In order for the employer to change this result, the Court
demanded that he show a "specific indication" of congressional intent to preempt an area extending to local control of state employ83
ment problems.
'The employer attempted to meet his burden of proof by demonstrating the comprehensive coverage of the federal immigration
29. Sweeping invalidation occurs as a consequence of the necessarily
broad and unaccommodating categories of express statutory or constitutional preemption.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
31. Id.
32. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963).
33. 96 S. Ct. at 937.

law. The Court responded that the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme may merely reflect the necessity to deal with the complexity of the subject matter "apart from any questions of preemptive intent."34
In the fourth step of the opinion, the Court found the language
of section 2051 of the federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration
Act3 5 persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt
all state regulation of alien employment. That provision provides
that the Act supplements existing state regulations governing employer hiring practices.3 6 The Court reasoned section 2805 reflected
a similar congressional acquiescence concerning employment of undocumented aliens as a distinct class. 37

The Court concluded that

neither the Immigration and Nationality Act 3" nor the general federal authority over immigration preempts section 2805.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING IN

DeCanas

The DeCanas decision has implications affecting the rights and
burdens of both the lawfully and unlawfully resident alien, the
validity of future state legislation which indirectly affects immigration, and the evidentiary value of the pervasive federal immigration scheme in future preemption analysis.
The Supreme Court's first ruling in DeCanas is that state statutory classification of aliens is not per se an attempt to regulate
innigration. That proposition leaves unanswered two corollary
inquiries: Will statutory treatment of undocumented aliens be considered constitutionally distinct from that of lawfully resident
aliens? And when will state regulation of undocumented aliens
be regarded as an attempt to regulate immigration?
Several reasons exist for allowing the states freedom to regulate
the conduct of undocumented aliens. First, the status of constitu34. Id. at 938 n.6.

35. 7 U.S.C. § 2041 et seq. (1974) requires registration of people employing migratory farmworkers in the United States. The purpose of registration is to permit the federal government to enforce the contractor's statutory
responsibilities for the farmworker, including-e.g., the deduction and
transmission of old-age and survivor's insurance withholdings.
36. Id. § 2051 provides:
This chapter and the provisions contained herein are intended to
supplement State action and compliance with this chapter shal not
excuse anyone from compliance with appropriate state law and regulation.
37. 96 S.Ct. at 939-40.
38. § 101 et seq., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970).
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tional and statutory personhood 39 attaches to the lawfully resident
alien by virtue of his lawful entry.4 0 Arguably, the undocumented
alien should not be accorded a similar panoply of constitutional
rights merely because he has chosen to be physically present in the
country. 4 1

39. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). Section 1981
states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
40. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75, 377-78 (1971).
41. Equal protection problems are admittedly distinct from issues of preemption. Nevertheless, in determining the degree of tolerable state interference with an existing federal scheme, the Supreme Court considers the
traditional importance of the state interest being served. Therefore, the issue of which groups of aliens the state mnay legitimately regulate becomes
pertinent to the preemption issue.
For example, the preservation of limited state resources through the denial of use or consumption by lawfully resident aliens as a distinct class
is not a traditionally recognized exercise of the police power. See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 415-22 (1948); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). In these
cases, the Court can reasonably conclude that even minimal or merely potential conflict with the federal immigration scheme would suffice to invalidate the state law. Cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976). Indeed, the
cases sometimes reinforce their equal protection arguments with reference
to the exclusive federal authority over immigration. See, e.g., Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 234 U.S. 410, 416, 419 (1948), citing Traux v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
A preemption analysis in these cases was unnecessary because the Court's
primary concern was with the individual rights of the lawfully resident
alien.
The principle emerging from these cases is that the Court has not considered preemption an ideological absolute. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941), establishes that preemption is a question turning on the circumstances of each case. These cases suggest that the desire to accommodate co-existent state and federal interests may involve an unarticulated
balancing of state, federal, and individual interests. DeCanas represents a
significant contribution to this area because of its original implications concerning the legitimacy of discriminatory state regulation of undocumented
aliens. 96 S. Ct. at 938.
This combination of state, federal, and individual interests is substantially
realigned as the primary focus shifts from equal protection, as in Traux
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), to an application of preemption doctrine, as
in DeCanas. The diminished equal protection claims of the undocumented

The diminished rights of the undocumented alien enhance the
ability of the state police power to withstand a preemption challenge. The equal protection considerations which invalidate certain
discriminatory classifications of lawfully resident aliens should not
operate to invalidate similar statutory treatment of undocumented
aliens. 42 Thus, a direct preemption analysis unencumbered by
equal protection questions is possible. That shift in emphasis will
probably be reflected in the reinforcement of the initial presumption favoring the continued operation of state law.
A remaining inquiry posed by the Court is: When will state statutory treatment of undocumented aliens as a distinct class be
treated as an attempt to regulate immigration? The statute upheld
in DeCanas regulates employers of undocumented aliens rather
than the aliens themselves. If a state were to prescribe criminal
or civil sanctions against the alien, the potential conflict between
alien enhance the ability of state law to withstand the challenges posed by
both the fourteenth amendment and preemption. See notes 42 &44 infra.
Recent decisions impliedly demonstrate the relative weights of these contending state, federal, and individual interests. In Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S.
Ct. 1883, 1894-95 (1976), the Court sustained a residence requirement discriminatorily imposed on lawfully resident aliens as a condition to receiving
Medicare benefits. The Court conceded that a state could not constitutionally impose similar restrictions.
On the same day, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895, 1904-

05 (1976), the Court qualified the Mathews decision. Employing an equal

protection analysis, the Court invalidated a Civil Service Commission rule
denying postal employment in certain regions to any resident alien. The
Court required that the Government show the rule actually served an overriding national purpose. Several considerations present in Hampton were
not wholly present in Mathews. These included the Commission's lack of
authority over immigration policy, the limited territorial application of the
rule, and the unconstitutionality of the rule if promulgated by an individual
state.
DeCanas is analogous to Hampton and Mathews in its treatment of a
state's authority to discriminatorily deny employment to undocumented
aliens. States may find it instructive to study the federal authority to
promulgate discriminatory statutes based on alienage as they construct corresponding state statutes which indirectly exclude undocumented aliens
from access to limited state resources.
42. See DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933, 938 n.6 (1976). See also Hearings
on H.R. 982 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship & International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 8, at 44 (1975):
Once in this country, aliens who have entered illegally are entitled
to a minimum of procedural due process, but we are not aware of
any decision suggesting that it would be a denial of equal protection to deny them government benefits. Indeed, we have no doubt
that a benefit statute distinguishing between those who have entered illegally would be upheld as a valid legislative distinction
[referring to federal legislation].
(emphasis added).
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state and federal enforcement mechanisms would be greatly aggravated. 43 In addition, there is no established standard of review
for state action allegedly denying undocumented aliens due process
or equal protection. 44 Therefore, states lack uniform guidelines
for the treatment of undocumented aliens analogous to those applicable to lawful residents. The absence of a clear standard 45 and
the consequent abuses suffered by undocumented aliens could result in international tensions.4 6 Foreign governments may also be,
less tolerant of state abuses of their nationals than of similar treatment by the federal government.
Further, a state statute which attempts to directly regulate undocumented alien conduct assumes the prima facie appearance of
an immigration law. Because of overlapping enforcement procedures,4? such a statute probably has a narrower margin of tolerable
interference with federal immigration law. The statute would also
invite opponents of the law to challenge the true motive and purpose behind the legislation. 48 These considerations support the view
43. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57, 65-66 (1941), generally

warning against the prospect of international conflict caused by repeated
interceptions and interrogations of both lawfully and unlawfully resident
aliens as a result of co-existing enforcement mechanisms. See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956).

44. Invariably, cases treating the constitutionality of state discrimination

based on classifications of alienage have involved only the rights of lawfully resident aliens. Despite the undifferentiated use in these decisions of

such terms as aliens and alienage, subsequent decisions have made unten-

able any possible extension of the cases to include unlawfully resident
aliens. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). Cf. DeCanas
v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976).
45. Although unlawfully resident aliens presently receiving statutory
benefits may subsequently be denied these benefits as a class without vio-

lations of equal protection, a due process issue remains: When may the
state withdraw the benefits? See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). Suspension of benefits pending a full determination of lawful residence may impose cruel hardships on both documented and undocumented
aliens. Accordingly, each state will have to fashion a procedure which will
weigh the individual's loss against the state's interest in summary adjudication. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
46. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57 (1941).
47. See note 43 supra.

48. The possibility always exists that state legislation is primarily moti-

that state law which directly regulates and enforces undocumented
alien conduct should be invalidated as an unconstitutional attempt
to regulate immigration.
The Court's second step is to assume that section 2805 has only
some indirect and purely speculative effect on immigration. 40 The
Court remanded the case to test the factual validity of that assumption. The significance of the assumption for future cases requires
an examination of the terms indirect and purely speculative.
The pitfalls of invoking the indirect-effect test in federalism cases
were noted by Justice Cardozo in his dissenting opinion in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.50 There, the majority held that local regulation
of employment relations in the coal mining industry was not preempted by the commerce clause. Characterizing the mining operations at the extractive stage as a purely local concern having no
relation to interstate commerce, the Court found any actual effect
on interstate commerce irrelevant. 1 The dissent advocated an
analysis which would incorporate the realities of intergovernmental
conflict in particular cases. In United States v. Darby,5 2 the Court
overruled Carter on that issue, adopting the test of whether the
federal legislation employed an appropriate means toward the attainment of a legitimate end. Thus, the Court, in effect, decided
that the question of degree was the crucial inquiry.

These cases do not directly answer the question of how great an
effect state statutes constitutionally may have on preexisting federal law and policy. They do, however, illustrate to the practitioner
the danger of relying on a mechanical application of the direct-indirect distinction. A preemption argument requires a sophisticated
advocacy of the importance and legitimacy of the competing government interests. The advocate must convincingly define the devated by a desire to control immigration. Such legislation can be invalidated if its unconstitutional objective is susceptible to exposure. See

Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902). That
the statute only "indirectly" affected immigration would not shelter the
constitutional defect. In practice, however, when the constitutional infirmity does not appear on the face of the legislation, the party challenging the
statute carries the nearly impossible burden of proving such unconstitutional motive. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv.
95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
49. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
50. 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
51. 298 U.S. at 244.
52. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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gree of marginal conflict which a court should tolerate in order to

preserve an existing state power.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's unqualified use of the term indirect in the DeCanas decision should not imply that direct state
regulation over the same subject matter for similar purposes will
necessarily be preempted. 53 When an important state interest is
involved, a ritualistic invocation of the direct-effect analysis must
be avoided. In such cases the test is not whether the state and
federal statutes share common means and objectives, but whether
54
the two can coexist without actual or necessary conflict.
The Court's use of the term "purely speculative" purposely
evades difficult questions of fact which trial courts will have to decide in future cases. To conclude that section 2805 has only a
"purely speculative" impact on immigration has questionable factual merit. The desire of the undocumented alien to better his economic position by entering the United States, though theoretically
speculative, can be substantiated.5 5 His search for a better life
56
hinges directly on his ability to find employment in this country.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that a state statute which has
the direct objective of denying employment to undocumented aliens
as a class will have a significant impact on immigration.
53. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199, 235, 239 (1824).
[Whenever] the powers of the respective governments are frankly
exercised, with a distinct view to the ends of such powers, they
may act upon the same object, or use the same means, and yet the
powers be kept perfectly distinct.
Id. at 239. See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 1(1949). Cf. DeVeau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
54. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963). Failure to recognize the cooperative capacity of state and federal
laws in individual cases has resulted in unnecessary invalidation of state
legislation. See Comment, The Impact of Preemption on Federal-State Cooperation, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 656.
55. See Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact
on the United States, 13 SAw DIEGo L. REV. 34, 37-39 (1975). For a suggested
solution to this international economic problem, see Manulkin & Maghame,
A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented Mexican Alien
Worker, id. at 42, 65.
56. "The mass migration of Mexicans to northern border areas is the result of a close contact of two different systems of government reflecting
different degrees of development." Statement of Jose Lopez Portillo, then
candidate for President of Mexico, San Diego Evening Tribune, May 23,
1976, § A, at 1, col. 4.

The Court's de-emphasis of this consideration indicates its desire
to preserve traditional state police powers from premature preemption.5 7 However, the state interest, no matter how traditionally revered, cannot prevail when antithetical to the realization of a legitimate federal objective. 58 The Court's willingness to speculate
may depend on its perception of the respective importance of the
state and federal interests at stake.
The third step in the Court's analysis is to persist in its initial
presumption of the validity of section 2805 despite the comprehensive coverage of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That the
federal government had not yet regulated employer hiring practices
was not interpreted to mean Congress wished the area to go completely unregulated by the states.5 9
The Court attributed the pervasiveness of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to the complexity of the immigration field rather
than to a congressional intent to preempt laws such as section 2805.
Thus the complexity of the immigration question enabled the Court
to find that Congress had not intended to preempt the entire field.
Paradoxically, however, the complexity of the field could logically lead to the opposite conclusion. Once the pervasive federal
scheme necessary for regulating a complex area is enacted, an increased number of potential conflicts with the federal network
arises. This expanded possibility for conflict in turn creates a
greater need for uniformity. The need for uniformity, in turn, indicates a congressional intent to preempt. Moreover, state legislatures, no less than Congress, will feel the temptation to enact intricate regulatory schemes to solve local problems closely related to
immigration law. The result may be an impossible burden on legal
draftsmanship as state legislatures attempt to compatibly intermesh
two complex and closely related regulatory programs. The very
fact of complexity multiplies the areas of potential intergovernmental controversy and could itself be considered grounds for preemption.
The DeCanas Court addressed none of these possibilities. Instead, precedent which depended on the complexity of the federal
statutory model as a basis for preemption was distinguished. In
Pennsylvaniav. Nelson,60 for example, the Couit considered a state
57. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

58. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comnn'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1948).
59. 96 S. Ct. at 939. Cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S.
1 (1957); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); Halter v. Nebraska, 205
U.S. 34 (1907); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827).

60. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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sedition law designed to preserve and protect the government of
Pennsylvania from Communist infiltration. In that case, unlike
DeCanas, ample evidence existed of Congress's desire to avoid all
conflict with the federal sedition statute. Also unlike DeCanas,the
Nelson statute touched directly upon the identical subject matter
already controlled by federal regulation.
Similarly, Hines v. Davidowitz61 was distinguished by the DeCanas Court as concerning a matter in controversy already completely covered by federal law. The question was not one of filling
an unlegislated gap, but rather one of whether federal immigration
law could be directly supplemented by state regulation. The great
potential for federal and international conflict6 2in Hines precluded
the possibility of supplemental state regulation.
In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,63 also distinguished in
DeCanas,gaps left by the federal legislative scheme were held unsusceptible to state regulation. In that case, a provision in the National Labor Relations Act 64 had permitted the federal labor board
to cede jurisdiction to the states. In striking down an attempt by
Utah to settle a local employment dispute, the Court reasoned that
if the federal government had intended to permit the state to intervene, it would have ceded jurisdiction. 5 Despite the importance
of the state interest and the impracticality of the cession procedure,66 the Court rested its decision on the potential implementation of the federal scheme.
When these cases are -iewed in a post-DeCanas setting, limitations on the inferential merit of a pervasive federal scheme become
evident. Despite comprehensive federal law in the area, the burden
of proving Congress's preemptive intent is more formidable when
a traditional state interest is served, when state law does not directly cover an area already treated by federal law, and when restatutes indicate congressional tolerance of state colated federal
67
regulation.
61. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

62. Id. at 63-66.

63. 353 U.S.1 (1957).
64. § 10 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1973).
65. 353 U.S. at 6-9.
66. Id. at 13, 15 (Burton, J., dissenting).
67. See also The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857
et seq. (1970).

The final major proposition asserted by DeCanas is that section
2051 of the federal Farm Labor Contractor Act 8 persuasively indicates Congress's intent to permit state regulation of alien employment. For several reasons, however, reliance on the persuasiveness
of that section may have been misplaced.
In contrast to California Labor Code § 2805, 69 the federal act is
not applicable to all types of employers.7 0 Section 2051 of the Act
could merely indicate an exception to Congress's general intent that
employment of undocumented alien labor be left unregulated in
other areas.7 1 The legislative history of the Act indicates Congress's concern for the peculiar abuses of the migratory farmworker
system.7 2 Nowhere is a similar concern expressed for other kinds
of employment relations.
Further, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act does not
specify the type of state regulation which it is meant to supplement.7 3 A review of the legislative findings reveals Congress was
concerned about the effective enforcement of state wage, safety, and
transportation laws.7 4 Unlike section 2805, these laws do not single
out undocumented aliens as a class. The above considerations render section 2051 at best equivocal evidence of congressional intent
to permit state regulation of local employment conditions through
statutes based on discriminatory classifications of alienage.7 5
IMPLICATION OF DeCanas TO THE EMPLOYER, THE ALIEN,
THE STATE, AD THE CONGRESS

The Employer
Many California employers not previously regulated by federal
immigration laws will now be burdened with duties imposed by sec68. 7 U.S.C. § 2041 et seq. (1973).

69. (West Supp. 1976); see CAL. AD. CODE tit. 8, pt. 1, ch. 8, art. 1, §§
16209-16209.6 (West 1975).
70. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2042(b) (1974),
defines the term farm labor contractor as
any person, who for a fee, either for himself or on behalf of another
person, recruits, solicits, hires, furnishes, or transports ten or more
migrant workers ... at any one time in any calendar year for interstate agriculturalemployment.
(emphasis added).
71. This anomaly may have resulted from lobbying pressures.
72. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3692-93.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 2051 (1974).
74. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3692-93.
75. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970), also lends
support to this conclusion. Section 1324 (a) specifically excludes employment of undocumented aliens from the definition of "harboring" for which
criminal penalties are imposed.
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tion 2805 of the California Labor Code. The employer is under a
statutory obligation to require proof of lawful residence as a condition to the applicant's employment. That requirement is satisfied
if the alien produces a current 1-151,76 commonly known as a green
card. If the applicant does not within three days produce his card
or other appropriate proof of lawful residence, the employer will
7
be presumed to know the applicant's undocumented alien status. 7
Strict compliance with section 2805 would require the employer
to demand proof of lawful residence from every applicant for a job,
regardless of whether the applicant appeared to be an alien. The
State Administrative Code7 8 does not permit the employer to assume lawful residence from physical appearance. Rather it requires him either to obtain documented proof or to suffer criminal
penalties. An all-inclusive duty of inquiry enforced by criminal
sanctions may be an unreasonable burden to place on employers.
Alternatively, an interpretation of the statute requiring the employer to demand proof of lawful residence only from people of apparent foreign ancestry could constitute a denial of equal protection
to those United States citizens fitting such a description.79 The employer may well complain that no reasonable interpretation of section 2805 could withstand an equal protection challenge.
It is not clear whether section 2805 will concurrently apply to
employers already regulated in a similar manner by federal regulation-e.g., farm labor contractors8 0 Direct state regulation of exactly the same subject matter as that covered by the federal scheme,
even for legitimate state purposes, should arguably be preempted,
especially if inharmonious enforcement procedures are created.
When both the methods and purposes of the state and federal regu76. Also known as the Alien Registration Receipt Card, it essentially
serves as a means of identification and as a reentry document. 8 C.F.R.
§ 223.1 (1976).
77. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 8, pt. 1, ch. 8, art. 1, § 16209.4 (West 1975).
78. Id. § 16209.1.

79. The resulting infringement on the rights of the alien-appearing individual is treated in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
See also Fragomen, ProceduralAspects of Illegal Search and Seizure in Deprotation Cases, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 151 (1976); Recent Development,
Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetralogy: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, id. at 257.
80. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2041 et seq.
(1974).

lation are the same, the employer should not be subjected to double
penalties, irrespective of preemption considerations.
The Alien
Section 2805 is not directly aimed at controlling alien conduct.
Practically, however, it has the effect of subjecting both lawfully
and unlawfully resident aliens to increased interrogations and
checks for lawful residence. While limited employer interrogations
will not be as offensive as police interrogations, even United States
citizens of foreign ancestry may now find their residence in this
country less comfortable as a result of section 2805. In addition,
if section 2805 is rigorously enforced, the employer may simply
avoid the expense, time, trouble, and danger of hiring any person
who appears to be an alien.
The lawful resident alien has been given new bargaining leverage
over his unlawful brethren. Section 2805(c) grants a civil remedy
to lawful residents wrongfully injured by an employer's knowing
employment of undocumented aliens. The employer may ultimately find hiring lawful residents more profitable.
In contrast, the undocumented alien will find employment more
difficult to obtain. That difficulty may either stem the illegal immigration influx or merely direct it to states other than California.
Undocumented aliens who work as migrant laborers may have to
terminate their migratory cycle prematurely upon entering California from states not having similar statutes. Those aliens who are
lawfully resident will have to be more conscientious about carrying
current registration cards.
Although not the direct target of the state enforcement mechanism, the undocumented alien has cause for concern. State control
of local employers will enable the state to monitor the location and
concentration of undocumented aliens. This information, if provided to federal authorities, will increase the undocumented alien's
risk of apprehension.8 1
The State
DeCanasimpliedly indicates that a state may discriminatorily exclude undocumented aliens from the distribution of limited state
resources, both natural and economic. These resources may range
81. See Comment, The Impact of Preemption on Federal-State Cooperation, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 656 (concerning the general feasibility of such federalstate cooperation).
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from land and housing to welfare8 2 and other social insurance. The
fact that such exclusionary laws depend on classifications of undocumented aliens will not per se result in preemption by the federal
immigration laws.
The DeCanas decision focuses upon several qualifications which
a state law should possess to withstand the challenge of preemption. First, section 2805 does not attempt to regulate undocumented
alien conduct directly. Second, the purpose of the statute is to secure during a time of need a limited resource to lawful residents
regardless of citizenship. Third, the object of the statute-employment relations -is one falling within the scope of the traditional
state police power. Fourth, the statute is based on preexisting federal definitions of lawful entry and residence and contains no provisions for independent state determinations of the extent and effect
of federal immigration law. As a matter of draftsmanship, future
laws should be in definitional harmony with key phrases in the immigration law83 and should shun even the appearance of local intent to affect immigration policy.
The Congress
The DeCanas decision may influence the outcome of legislation
now pending in Congress. Senate Bill 3074,84 introduced by Senator Eastland,8 5 would provide administrative penalties against employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens. Representatives
of employment agencies or labor organizations who knowingly refer
undocumented aliens for employment would also be subject to penalties.
Senate Bill 3074 is similar to other bills which either are in committee or are awaiting full congressional approval.8 6 Each bill pro82. For a description of a recent California program designed to withhold
welfare benefits from undocumented aliens, see San Diego Evening Tribune,
August 6, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 1.
83. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976) avoids a fatal inconsistency with federal immigration law by including holders of Alien Registration Receipt Cards within the definition of aliens "entitled to lawful residence," which is found in CAL. AD. CODE tit. 8, pt. 1, ch. 1, art. 1, § 16209
(West 1975).
84. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
85. Senator Eastland is the Chairman of the United States Judiciary
Committee.
86. See 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 170 (1976). The proposed legislation

poses to sanction employers who know or should know they are
hiring undocumented aliens. The persistent congressional effort to
enact amendments to the immigration law essentially duplicating
California Labor Code § 2805 indicates one of at least two possibilities. It may mean that Congress wishes to clarify its original intent
to preempt the field, or it may mean that Congress is preparing
to change its original tolerance of state co-regulation. In either
event, the effect of section 2805 on the attainment of federal immigration objectives may influence Congress's ultimate decision to
pass pending legislation.
CONCLUSION

In DeCanas v. Bica, the Supreme Court dispelled any misconception that a state statute which treats undocumented aliens as a class
is per se an unconstitutional attempt to regulate immigration. In
effect, the Court recognized that some indirect effect on the exclusive federal authority over immigration may be inevitable if a state
is to protect the interests of its lawful residents. In reaching its
decision, the Court emphasized the traditional importance of the
state interest in employment, the harmonious manner in which the
state provision was fitted within the web of related federal regulation, and the fact that section 2805 treated aliens as a class only
indirectly in order to accomplish a recognized state concern.
DeCanas has both theoretical and practical importance. Theoretically, it represents a significant contribution to the concept of
American federalism. Its analysis will undoubtedly be invoked in
any argument for the continued integrity of state law in our federal
division of powers. A major practical consequence of the decision
is that states will now look to DeCanas for guidance in the creation
of statutes resembling section 2805. Such prospective state legislation has profound implications not only in the field of immigration
but also in other areas where state and federal interests are closely
related.
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